Future of North Korea Economy: Politics over Economic Policy

Future of northern Korea Economy Politics Over sparing Policy The terms starvation, isolation, tyranny, and thermo thermonuclear ambitions combined would remind most good deal the hermit kingdom in East Asia, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, and its Kim dynasty. After the demise of the aged dictator Kim Jong Il in declination 2011, the area went done a period of mourning the devastation of their beloved Great General and, chthonicgoing a power succession to his 29-year-old son, Kim Jong Un. He has been k instantaneouslyn to shoot attended a Swiss school in his childhood years, enjoying playing b studyetball and video games (Yan & Shubert, 2011).However, even though many an(prenominal) awaysiders curb a hopeful outlook on this materialization dictator to be somewhat liberal in both economic and political perspectives, analyzing the situation by dint of levels of analysis suggests that he is improbable to be any different than his predecessors. In f move, because master(prenominal)taining the nations authoritarian Kim dynasty and communistic political dodge is the most important objective for matrimony Korea, he leave alone probably continue to put low priority on economy, defying multi case norms as a totalitarian nation of a closed, stiffly planned economy.The Three Levels Explained The levels-of-analysis is an approach conceptualized by Kenneth Waltz in his deem Man, the State, and War to understand global politics by categorizing different factors moldable pronounces behaviors (Ray, 2001). The approach exactly ift joint be categorized in to three levels the soulfulness level, which underscores the roles played by individual leaders, nation-state level, focusing on interaction in the midst of non-homogeneous actors under the nations political system and enculturation, and the system level, addressing distribution of power in the international system (Dorff, 2004).Although levels-of-analysis problem, regarding l imitation and vagueness of desegregation units, is an ongoing issue according to James Lee Ray (2001), the levels can be integrated more than than simply in to a more structured and comprehensive analysis when they are considered as different informative variables of different location as in this case. Individual Level of abstractKims past actions show that his main goal is consolidating and fight d birthing ultimate power through an authoritarian, inhumane method that closely resembles his fathers methods. His fondness for Michael Jordan and his chic, swish wife may give the impression that he would adopt a more open leadership, but since succession, he has been ruthlessly eliminating anyone in his port of solidifying power at bottom the ruling party, plot of land also verbally and physically provoking randomness Korea.not dogged aft(prenominal) ascending to the dope, he executed Kim Chol, vice minister of the armament, with a mortar troll for reportedly drinking a nd carousing during the official mourning period after Kim Jong Ils death (Ryall, 2012). Moreover Klug (2012) reported that Ri Yong Ho, the array party boss who was Kims mentor during the power transition and one of the key figures that the source leader relied upon, had also been removed from his position, for health reasons, this July.Baek Seung-joo of the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis say that these replacements of influential soldiers officers and purges of over a dozen ripened officials are signs that the young dictator is reshuffling the cabinet to appoint pile loyal to him, plot also keeping check of any assertable dissidents (Kim, 2012). In addition, Kim has clearly shown that he is not concerned with international norms when he reportedly played a study role in plan the shelling of South Koreas territory, Yeonpyeong Island, a couple of years ago (Yang, 2012).Statements threatening to attack South Korea and its key figures have also escalated in a harsher, specific tone after the change of leadership, even out threatening to send revolutionary armed forces to reduce all the ratlike hosts and the bases for provocations to ashes in three or four minutes, in much shorter time, by unprecedented peculiar means and methods of our own style in April (Choe, 2012). Byman and Lind (2010) deed that these provocations help Kim to stoke popular nationalism, while intoneing his position within the phalanx.It has been only a few years since Kim entered politics, but these series of eliminating potentially threatening figures, including even those who have helped in smoothing the transition, and continuous provocation to the international society suggest that consolidating power through provocation and purging is the main focus of Kim on the individual level. Even if Kim Jong Un succeeds in gaining stable power, it is unlikely that he would be enthusiastic in bringing forth major(ip) economic put rights as expected by some analysts because such lengthy reforms could undermine his ascendance as they would risk loyalty of the military and the party.As Ben Ascione (2012) argues, unless the military becomes a major stake holder in economic reforms through generating profit instead of depleting huge amounts of North Koreas budget, economic reforms will have to be pursued at the cost of the military commencement exercise policy, which is a guideline his father, prioritizing the military in allocating resources to foster loyalty from the army by strengthening its position. Therefore, Kim would have to face dissatisfied military elites if he were to start expensive economic reforms.He may have vowed to develop the economy, and rumors have spread that he will push through reforms leave behinding farmers to keep 30% of their yield, eventually replacing the state rationing system, but these reforms have been postponed numerous times, while the state has even officially denied any intent to reform and called the expectation a fool ish and silly dream (Where the Sun, 2012). atomic aspiration is an opposite major characteristic of Kim Jong Un that makes economic reforms unlikely in the near future as this deters the possibility of the army profiting from economy growth.Pouring billions of national money into growing nuclear program can be traced screening to more than half a century ago, when his grandfather had allegedly became intimidate by the joined States placing nuclear-tipped Matador missiles in South Korea (Pincus, 2006). Kim Jong Un shares the same goal for developing nuclear weapons, showed by launching North Koreas forth rocket, criticized by the international community as a disguise for developing long distance missile, while also declaring to launch once more this December (Ramstad, 2012).North Koreas drive for nuclearization has been condemned by the international society and resulted in a UN Security confidence that aim to deter North Korea from acquiring goods for its nuclear programs (Albri ght & Walrond, 2012). Therefore, since profiting from the military sector is nearly impossible without trade, which is difficult under current international sanctions unless Kim gives up nuclearization, heavy economic reform is a dangerous option for Kim if he wishes to heighten loyalty from the military to maintain power.Nation-state Level of Analysis The unique culture and political system of North Korea combined with the military first policy create an environment where argue the leader is almost impossible, resulting in an ideal political system for sustaining totalitarianism regime. After decades of propaganda, the juche ideology, emphasizing autarky, or self- sufficiency, and suryong ideology, which means leader and which idolizes the Kim family, have now become almost a religion for the North Korean wad (Byman & Lind, 2010).These ideologies have permeated every aspects of the closed society to an extent that many North Koreans are xenophobic, feeling strong hatred and disgust toward the United States and South Korea (Byman & Lind, 2010). According to Brian Myers (2010), North Korean math textbooks ask questions of Three Peoples Army soldiers rubbed out thirty American bastards. What was the ratio of the soldiers who fought? , while dictionaries and schoolbooks endorse students to call foreigners muzzles and snouts.Myers continues on to say that these kinds of propaganda leads to form a culture of ethno-centric nationalism, where the North Korean people sincerely believe in their billets pureness and superiority over an other(a)(prenominal) races, while reward their great father. South Koreans were shocked when they heard the news of the modernised looking North Korean cheering squad turning tearing with tears when they saw a portrait of their beloved father ridiculous in rain, running out of the bus to protect his face on the banner ad (Kum, 2003).Even if the effects of propaganda might have weakened through the influx of South Korean m ovies and drama series, Ken E. Gause (2012) effect that the state constantly conducts surveillance and investigation on ordinary citizens through various overlapping security organizations, which can even lead to execution of those who have been found to violate law and order, thereby effectively blocking the noncombatant sector from forming any opposition groups.Government and military officials are no exceptions but are rather even more spied upon through organizations such as the Political Bureau and Military Security Command (Gause, 2012). On the other hand, the military first policy favoring the military serves to encourage loyalty from the group most needed to enforce power and stability. These conditions of propaganda, surveillance, and favoritism form a somewhat stable internal politics, consisting of only the supreme leader and his favour military officials, that has lasted for three generations of dictatorship and seen by some, including Albright and Walrond, to last f or ore. Moreover, these dimensions shaping the domestic cultural and political nature of North Korea act as subvert to economic reform, which cannot be prospering if the state does not give up its military first policy and rigid rules. The ethno-centric nationalism promoted by the ii ideologies deters many North Koreans from accepting their system to be a bereavement in comparison with democratic countries such as the United States and South Korea (Myers, 2010).Thus, North Koreans would have greater utility from any minor improvements in standard in living through weak reforms. This would incentivize Kim to focus more on propaganda and security, while maximizing the use of propaganda to indoctrinate people of how successful the economic reforms, if any, were, thanks to the regime. This could be the reason why Kim Jong Un continuously emphasize that he will improve economy, but drags on doing much change.Also, Un-Chul Yang found that momentum of economic reform diminishes because economics is strictly considered to be confederate to politics, which leads to rejection of economic policies, no matter how keen they may be, if they challenge the authority of the supreme leader (2012). The two largest and only players in domestic politics, Kim and the military, collectable to the unique structure of the society, will thereby choose to continue the military first policy to conserve their power and maintain the totalitarian regime. brass Level of AnalysisIt is highly unlikely for North Korea to give up its only mean of leverage in international relations nuclear weapons. Not only are they significant in building support from the military internally, they bolster North Koreas stance more than any other weapon in the power and legitimacy struggle with its South Korea (Byman Lind, 2010). Moreover, the weapons allow North Korea to have an upper hand in negotiations for food, energy, and other economic assistance with other major powers. They even incentivized it s only ally, chinaware, to bribe the country with cash and energy aids to just sit them down at the negotiating table (Kim, 2006).Because of these power incentives, North Korea will be more indisposed to give its nuclear ambitions up, leading to further economic sanctions from the international society, while North Korea would try to maximize its gains from utilizing the leverage to compensate for the loss from sanctions obligate by the United Nations Security Council. David Albright and Christina Walrond (2012) says that China continues to be a major loop hole of this international sanction, giving North Korea plenty of opportunities to undertake resources for developing its nuclear program.Albright and Walrond (2012) also predicts in their ISIS report that North Koreas nuclear program and uranium enrichment efforts will continue, and succeed in building at least 28 nuclear weapons by 2016. Therefore, as North Koreas nuclear programs continue rather successfully regardless of i nternational condemn, it is ironically rational for North Korea to keep its economy closed and planned to strengthen its power, stability, and leverage in international relations. Conclusion and Future PerspectivesIn conclusion, Kim Jong Uns own motivations to hold power, the unique political system and culture of North Korea, and rational choices that the country should make to win the power struggle would all act in favor for a closed, planned economy. Unlike South Korea and other democratic nations where the economic situation greatly influences politics, North Korea have been steered by the regime for so long that everything including economy now depends only on the government.Hence, despite recently being named as the sexiest man of the year 2012 by The Onion, Kim Jong Un would also remain an unappealing Kim for his democratic counterparts. The major stakeholders including the Unites States, South Korea, and China should continue to negotiate with North Korea to convince them t hat their gain from opening up is greater than following their traditional acts of provocation. Also, China should not allow North Korea to exploit its weak implementation of export controls and should bind to the U. N.Security Councils sanction to put greater pressure on North Korea. Even though future prospective is still dark in the current situation, more intimate negotiation and actions of responsibility from Beijing could result in imperative news in the future. References Albright, D. , & Walrond, C. (2012, August 16). North Koreas estimated stocks of atomic number 94 and weapon-grade uranium. Institute for Science and International Studies. Retrieved from http//isis-online. org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/dprk_fissile_material_p